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Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia
With Particular Reference to India

ethnic agendas accordingly. They base them not only
on their own social and economic interests seen in isolation but also on their perceptions of the interests of
others in the same arena with whom they must compete for limited political assets. Ethnic groups have
sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of
means. These include the formation and support of
political parties and other organizations; selective support for nonethnic political parties and sympathetic
candidates; discriminatory legislation when an ethnic
group controls the government at a particular level;
and, when the group is out of power, propaganda,
strikes, demonstrations, economic boycotts, and so
forth. Groups may also deliberately resort to the use of
force, even to the point of large-scale insurrection .
More often, however, violence occurs when confrontations with other groups or with the government get
out of control. Violence has, in fact, at times marked
virtually every type of ethnic movement discussed in
this paper and has repeatedly affected every major
region and virtually every state of India, as well as the
other countries of South Asia (figure 9).

Joseph E. Schwartzberg
Professor of Geography
University of Minnesota

Introduction
The following survey of evolving South Asian ethnicity generally supports the position of Paul Brass
(1991, p. 8), who asserts that:
. . . ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens' but are
social and political constructions. They are creations
of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they
wish to represent in order to protect their well-being
or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups, as well as for themselves.
[Further] ethnicity and nationalism are modem phenomena inseparably connected with the modem centralizing state.

I would attach more importance than Brass does, however, to the so-called primordial loyalties that inhere
in one's birth. While these may not be immutable givens, they do represent a reservoir of cultural identifiers
from which elites can draw as they assess specific
political situations and make a calculus of the costs
and benefits of seeking to elicit particular types of
support. Among these identifiers are caste, religion,
sect (which may be locally important, but which I cannot explore in this brief paper), language, dialect (also
not discussed), and regional loyalty. Birth within a
particular group does matter. Cultural norms may be
plastic, but they are not putty, to be molded at will.
They are potent and they tend to endure. Hence, politicians can go only so far in reshaping ethnic identities.
I would also stress more than Brass and other political
commentators do the importance of geographic arenas. I repeatedly refer in this paper to changes in political boundaries and show that the political actors
thrown together within the administrative limits of
any newly reconfigured country or state adjust their

The Government of India has responded to the political demands of ethnic groups in ways no less varied than those used by the groups themselves. On numerous occasions, as in regard to state reorganization and
the demand for quotas, it has bowed to organized public pressures. At the other extreme, it has often
resorted to the use of substantial force, especially in
dealing with secessionist movements in its border
regions, whether they be of tribals in the northeast or
Sikhs or Kashmiris in the northwest. Between these
extremes, numerous options existed. At times the government successfully co-opted the leadership of specific groups, made expedient compromises with them,
or acquiesced in their control over local polities, provided they did not transcend certain limits. Alternatively, the central government has used its substantial
control over fiscal resources and other economic
levers to gain favor or punish dissent; it has also interfered in numerous ways in local politics-a cause of
particular alienation in the case of Kashmir--declaring certain groups and activities illegal, jailing dissidents, and frequently suspending the elected
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Figure 9
Ethnic Violence in India, 1972-1990
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legislative assembly and imposing President's or Governor's Rule.
The potential for serious and enduring damage to
existing polities from ethnically rooted violence, both
intranationally and internationally, is great and
appears to be increasing. From 1972 to 1980, India
experienced serious ethnic violence in 67 percent of
all months, and South Asia as a whole experienced
such violence in 95 percent of all months. For the
period 1981 to 1990, the figures rose to 94 percent and
100 percent for India and South Asia, respectively.
From an ethnic perspective, South Asia is arguably the
most complex and one of the most turbulent regions of
our planet. Its political map is far from frozen. One
may safely anticipate a number of changes in the foreseeable future, many of which will be driven by agendas of specific ethnic groups. Whatever these changes
may be, they will, in turn, surely give rise to new
manipulations of ethnic identities to suit the needs of
new situations.
This presentation considers the various historical processes that have shaped ethnic identities in South
Asia, concentrating, because of limitations of time and
space, on India and on the postindependence period. It
also discusses specific bases for establishing ethnic
identities and the periods, situations, and locales in
which they assumed importance. It also notes the
means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their
interests and by which governments respond to such
efforts. I shall not, however, strive for completenessthe topic is simply too vast. Omitted from consideration here is any discussion of ethnic relations in
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Even for India, I
shall do no more than touch lightly on the two most
troublesome contemporary ethnic problems: the Sikh
struggle for an independent Khalistan and the complex struggle in Kashmir being waged simultaneously
by forces seeking independence, on the one hand, or
merger with Pakistan on the other. Virtually all the
empirical data that I shall be presenting are drawn
from the updated 1992 edition of the Historical Atlas
of South Asia, which synthesizes information from a
multitude of sources, only a small part of which are
noted in the bibliography accompanying this paper.
Although the interpretations of those data are my own,
I doubt that any are wholly original.
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Processes of Ethnic Identity Formulation
Birth into a particular group still matters far more in
South Asia than it does in areas of other major civilizations. One is expected to be "true to one's salt";
one's essence and traditions are all determined by
birth.
Jati, which generally connotes caste, translates literally as birth. One is born into a particular caste in
accordance with one's karma-the net merit or
demerit of actions performed in previous existences. If
one properly follows in the present life the forms of
behavior appropriate to caste status, one may aspire to
rebirth in a higher caste. This axiomatic belief forms
the essence of Hindu dharma, which may be translated either as duty or religion. These observations are
made with specific reference to Hinduism but are
equally applicable to Buddhism and lainism. The
behavioral norms on which they are based have
strongly influenced communities of other coexisting
faiths of South Asia as well, even Muslims, for whom
the very notion of caste is theoretically anathema. For
example, few Indian Muslims, before the creation of
Pakistan, would have hesitated to identify the social
group to which they belonged by a name that would
conjure up in the minds of their non-Muslim neighbors a particular caste-defined set of roles and a specific genre de vie.
For most South Asians and for most of the region's
history, caste was the principal referent of one's place
in society. The vast majority of the population lived in
villages in which their appropriate social and economic roles were rooted primarily in caste. Social and
intellectual horizons in such a setting were typically
very limited, and political action, such as it was, was
generally confined to a narrow spatial arena. Affairs of
state were the domain of small classes of elite.
Although the encompassing sacred realm of Bharat, or
India, found a place in the consciousness of Hindus,
communal activities at an all-India level were nonexistent. At a regional level, devotion to the cult of a particular deity or to a saintly figure and participation in
major fairs and pilgrimages did provide some feeling

of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I
would argue, were generally weaker, at least among
Hindus, than were those of caste.
The unification of India under the British and the
accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transportation and communications network, literacy, the press,
and notions of democratic governance brought about a
number of important changes in the way that people
saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction.
While identification with and loyalty to one's caste
remained important, other social attributes became
increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and
political interaction were established. New, more-orless Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites
came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu,
these new elites drew also from other religious communities and from many linguistic regions. In some
situations, especially after the creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus
for an emerging PanIndian, nontraditional, nationalism. In other contexts, however, socially and culturally defined groups vied with one another for privilege
and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and religious identities, many Indians became increasingly
aware of regional attachments that were previously
only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a particular language or dialect. The range of politically relevant primordial loyalties-those that form the basis
for what we now recognize as ethnicity-was
expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say
that one's identity--or jati-today means much more
than caste alone.
The British rulers recognized the latent potential for
disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity
of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and
often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control
over their own destinies. In each of a series of major
constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils
Act of 1909 and the Government of India Acts of
1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of specific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee
some semblance of fair representation in the evolving
legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim population was accorded special recognition. Subsequently,
concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected
seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians,
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Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as
well as for such special interests as Indian commerce
and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor,
and even women. Whether the course adopted was an
attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative
democracy or a cynical policy of "divide and conquer" depends on whose version of history one
chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recognizing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a
share of the political pie was set firmly in place,
thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities.
The establishment of quotas remains a part of the
political modus operandi to this day, although the
rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to
another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to population. Depressed groups-officially designated
"Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes"-are
guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and
state legislatures, of positions in various lower and
middle levels of government employment, and of
acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules
of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quotas for places on party tickets, for participation in state
and provincial ministries, or for a share of the economic largess over which certain agencies of government have control, are more flexible and situationspecific. These informal quotas are often determined
by deals made by party bosses in response to promises
of support or various pressures by specific groups.
Institutionalized religious quotas are presently
unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but
the Muslim voting bloc-roughly one-ninth of the
total Indian electorate and much more than that in several regions-retains an informal claim to a share of
power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which
the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of
Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the
national and provincial legislatures, as have other
minorities and women.
Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been
fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups,
some ascending and others descending in the local

social hierarchy, has been abundantly documented. So
too has been the frequent creation of new groups
through fission of older ones and the less common
amalgamation or fusion of groups when that suited a
particular purpose. While these processes have operated since ancient times, the pace of change has accelerated greatly over the past century. Many new forms
of identity have been socially, and often deliberately,
constructed in response to the evolving corporate
agendas of would-be players on the political stage.
The institutionalization of democracy and the attendant politicization of more and more previously inert
groups underlie these changes. Clever politicians have
recognized that "pushing the right buttons" to elicit
some sort of ethnically rooted response-whether
based on religion, language, caste, tribal affiliation, or
regional sentiment-was the most efficacious way of
attracting a following and attaining power. Temporary
alliances of convenience with others playing the same
game were often established. This strategy was especially common in regions where few persons held
deep ideological convictions.

Types of Ethnic Identity in the 20th Century
Emergent Nationalism
Two political parties acted as the vehicle for the
expression of emergent Nationalism during the preindependence period. The creation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885 was an outcome of a newly
nascent Indian nationalism. The Congress quickly
became the principal Pan-Indian vehicle for the freedom struggle. When the Muslim League came into
being in 1906, however, it embarked on a more parochial course. It set its agenda as much by its perceptions of the likely effects of Congress activities on the
welfare of India's Muslim community as on its views
of the British raj. Not surprisingly, the League vacillated between periods of cooperation with the Congress and periods of fierce opposition to it. As powers
were devolved toward the provinces, the importance
of success in electoral contests gradually widened the
rift between the two parties. Yet it was not until 1940
that the die was irrevocably cast in favor of establishing a separate state for India's Muslim community.
The requisite ethnic rationale invented for that state
was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "two-nation" theory. It
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was the idea that India's population consisted essentially of a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation whose
core identities and goals were so fundamentally different that there was no hope that they could coexist
within a single independent state without serious
adverse consequences for the Muslim minority. In
1947, Jinnah's dream of an independent Pakistan was
fulfilled. At the same time, the Congress dream of a
secular, all-embracing Indian nation was shattered.
Partition and the massive population transfers that followed still left roughly a third of South Asia's Muslims in India; this concentration continues to provide a
basis for ethnic tensions. The more than 100 million
Muslims in India today constitute by far the world's
largest ethnic minority. Few parts of the country are
without a significant Muslim presence. Within the
Indian-held portion of the disputed state of Jammu
and Kashmir, Muslims form a substantial majority.
The dispute over Kashmir has been the cause of two
wars between India and Pakistan, and the area also figured prominently in the war that led to the independence of Bangladesh. Within Kashmir a bitter
multisided insurrection is now in progress as some
separatists seek an independent state and others union
with Pakistan. Sustained Indo-Pakistani enmity periodically makes life precarious for India's Muslims
despite the country's constitutional commitment to a
secular state with religious liberty for all.
Muslims, of course, are not the only significant religious minority in India. Five of India's 25 states have
Sikh, Christian, or animistic majorities (figure 10),
and, with the exception of the mainly tribal state of
Arunachal Pradesh in the far northeast, all have been
scenes of bitter ethnic struggles in the postindependence period. The most intense of these struggles is
that of Punjab's Sikhs for an independent Khalistan,
waged intermittently since 1981. The present period is
one of relative quiescence, but the problem remains
unresolved. I shall defer till later discussion of the ethnic struggles of several tribal regions.

Figure 10
Distribution of Non-Hindus in India, 1981
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Linguistic Affiliation as an Organizing Principle
Language, formerly of relatively little political importance, has since 1947 emerged as a potent political
force in Hindu-majority areas despite the lingering
role of religion as an aspect of ethnicity in postpartition. As a matter of organizational convenience, the
Congress Party, beginning with Bihar in 1908, began
to organize itself into linguistic provinces, even
though most of the provinces of British India and several of the larger princely states were multilingual
entities. It was not until 1920, however, that the Congress Party established linguistic units throughout
British India and made the creation of linguistic
administrative provinces a plank in its platform for
political reform. As Congress saw it, the arbitrariness
of the political map that resulted from the unplanned
history of British territorial acquisition in India was an
affront to the natural aspirations of India's major linguistic groups. In any event, the call for linguistic
provinces was overshadowed as an issue by the more
inclusive agenda of Gandhi's noncooperation movement. Conceivably, an unstated motive in the Congress Party's call for linguistic provinces was to divert
popular attention away from communally based politics.
The first postindependence demand for a linguistic
state came from Telugu speakers, the largest among
several major minorities in the then Tamil-dominated
state of Madras. The demands persisted, and Congress
conceded by establishing the new Telugu-speaking
state of Andhra in 1954. This opened the floodgates to
calls for additional states based on linguistic criteria.
The government then established a States Reorganization Commission to study the problem, and ultimately
the States Reorganization Act of 1956 led to a radical
redrawing of the political map. The 1956 Act, however, failed to divide the essentially bilingual state of
Bombay and the putatively bilingual state of Punjab.
These intentional departures from the new linguistic
state norms were short lived. Bombay was partitioned
in 1960 to form the Marathi-speaking state of Maharashtra and the Gujarati-speaking state of Gujarat. In
1966, Punjab was also partitioned, allegedly on a linguistic basis, but in actuality on communal grounds;
when the government acceded to the Sikh demands
for a reconfigured Punjab, the reduced area of the new
state was one in which Sikhs became an absolute
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majority. Figure 11 reveals the extensive changes
wrought by linguistic reorganization over the period
1951-72.
The government's conciliatory attitude in regard to
linguistic reorganization did not mollify linguistic
groups sufficiently to guarantee their loyalty to the
Union government. Within Madras, in particular, a
demand arose for an independent Dravidian nationsometimes dubbed "Dravidistan"-to comprise the
four new linguistic states in which Dravidian languages were spoken. As matters transpired, the three
other Dravidian states of South India showed relatively little enthusiasm for a Tamil-led Dravidian
nation, and the movement lost its momentum. But one
lasting outcome was the rise to power of the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a Tamilian ethnic party
established in 1949. Alone or at the head of a multiparty coalition, the DMK has ruled Madras, or Tamil
Nadu as it was renamed in 1969, for all but six years
since it first came to power in 1967. Arguably, the prudent willingness of the Congress Party to allow ethnically minded Tamil politicians to enjoy the rewards of
power did as much as the lack of separatist ardor in
neighboring Dravidian states to blunt secessionist
demands. Had the movement succeeded, it would
almost certainly have led to the Balkanization of
India.
Demands for reorganizing the political map of independent India were not all rooted in linguistic consciousness. Several newly created linguistic states
contained regions that lagged notably behind others in
levels of economic and social development. As a rule,
areas that had formed a part of British India were generally more advanced than those previously ruled by
the less progressive princes, such as the Nizam of
Hyderabad. Regions lagging behind the political core
areas of the states to which they were joined soon
sensed that the state was not doing enough to rectify
the ill-effects of past neglect. This, in tum, led to several demands for separation, fueled by local politicians who sought to harness local discontent as the
vehicle for furthering their own political ambitions. To
what extent those politicians and their followers were

Figure 11
Linguistic Minorities in India

1972

1951

......
Vol
-.....)

Linguistic Minorities as a
Percentage of State or
Union Territory Population

,

. fC

•
\.

.
of
\

Percent

!!:~
:::::::

~~

·1·

0

~

.t•
\.of·

\

Uncensured Areas and Sikkim

State or union territory boundary
736077 6-95

able to construct a regional sense of ethnicity cannot
readily be determined, but none of these attempts to
achieve a separate state succeeded.
Another outcome of states reorganization was the
escalation of what have been called "nativistic" movements. In such movements the dominant linguistic
group of a particular state, styling themselves as "sons
of the soil," sought, by a combination of legal measures, intimidation, and violence, to limit the opportunities of immigrant groups from other states-and
sometimes of indigenous Muslims as well-and, in
some instances, to create legal obstacles to their settlement. The strongest of these movements were in
Assam and Maharashtra.

Tribal and Caste-Based Ethnicity
A number of tribal groups who aspired either to statehood within the Indian union or to full independence
were disregarded in the initial phase of the linguistic
reorganization. In the mineral-rich Chhota Nagpur, in
the northeast of peninsular India, tribals had established a forerunner of the present-day Jharkhand Party
as early as 1939. The party has campaigned intermittently for a tribal state since the parliamentary elections of 1957. Other groups, most notably the Nagas
and later the Mizos along India's northeastern borders,
resorted to armed rebellion. Many among these frontier tribals were Christians, almost all spoke languages
unrelated to the major languages of the states in which
they lived, and very few had reason to feel a deep
sense of loyalty to India. Their struggles were at times
abetted by foreign Christian groups as well as by Pakistan and China, all of which provided them with moral
and/or material support.
The Indian Government's attitude in dealing with
tribal demands was generally less conciliatory than it
was in respect to other ethnic groups. Ultimately,
however, through a combination of military suppression, co-optation of compliant leaders, and other tactics, accommodations were reached with elements of
each of the rebellious frontier groups, and many new,
tribally dominated administrative units-either union
territories or fullfledged states-were established. The
much more numerous, but also more pacific, tribal
groups, however, continue to find their political aspirations frustrated.
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The role of caste in the postindependence period has
changed considerably. In the past, power at the local
level was typically shared by the dominant landholding group and the ritually supreme Brahmans. Each
group legitimized the role of the other in its appropriate sphere. With the coming of democracy, however,
numbers, rather than ritual ascendancy or other claims
to elite status, became increasingly important determinants of power. Throughout India, at all levels of government and across the political spectrum, parties
appealed to particular types of caste constituencies to
gain support. Local magnates-believed to control
large "vote banks" of their caste followers-offered
their support to specific parties in return for a place on
the ballot. Single castes rarely composed an absolute
majority of the electorate; alliances among various
caste groups were therefore common.
Anti-Brahmanism had become a potent political force
in some regions even in the preindependence period.
The appeal of Charan Singh to a wide spectrum of
middle-level peasant castes over much of the Hindispeaking area of India was a key factor in catapulting
the J anata Party to power in 1978, following the
period of emergency rule initiated by Indira Gandhi in
1975. The desire for empowerment among middlelevel groups found expression during the period of
Janata rule in the creation of the MandaI Commission,
which drew up a report in 1982 suggesting a new set
of quotas for the numerically strong so-called Other
Backward Castes (OBCs) similar to those that the
Constitution already guaranteed to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. Although the Janata Party did
not remain in power long enough to implement the
provisions of the Commission's report, the decision to
do so by a new National Front government in 1990
touched off a wave of violent protest over large parts
of India and contributed to the government's collapse
shortl y thereafter.
Below the OBCs in India's social hierarchy are the
Scheduled Castes, formerly untouchables, who compose roughly a sixth of the nation's total population.
Their struggle for equality before the law and for
humane treatment by traditionally superior groups has

been a difficult one, reminiscent in many ways of the
American civil rights movement in respect to blacks.
In some parts of India, especially Bihar, the peasantry-for whom the Scheduled Castes mainly work
as landless laborers-have responded with incredible
brutality to attempts by Scheduled Castes to better
their lot. In other areas, most notably Maharashtra,
large numbers of the group have adopted a new ethnic
identity by conversion to Buddhism, employing a
social dynamic comparable to that of the Black Muslim movement among blacks in America. Other Harijans have been converting to Islam.
Hindu Nationalism
Hindu ethnicity sank roots even before the tum of the
present century. Within the Congress Party there
emerged the powerful conservative voice of a Marathi
Brahman, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who perceived in the
increasing Westernization of India's elite the seeds of
the destruction of Hindu culture. He sought, sometimes violently, to oppose the British presence. No
less conservative in some respects, but far more tolerant of non-Hindu perspectives, was Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence and his
fruitful collaboration with the liberal and secularminded Jawaharlal Nehru lessened the following for
Tilak's brand of Hindu nationalism for decades but
could hardly extinguish its appeal. Even before Tilak's
death in 1920, Hindu nationalism was institutionalized
in various guises, beginning with the Hindu Mahasabha, founded in 1907 in part as a reaction to the creation of the Muslim League. Although never posing a
serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was
particularly influential in the period before and just
after partition in fomenting anti-Muslim activities and
in giving credibility to Jinnah's aforementioned twonation theory. Also noteworthy is the militant and fascistic Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association), one of whose members
assassinated Gandhi in 1948. Founded in 1925, it
remains a potent force, especially in Maharashtra, the
region of its inception.
Despite their high visibility and local prominence, no
Hindu nationalist party in the postindependence
period even came close to gaining control over any
state legislature, not to mention Parliament, until
1990. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, however, gained
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heightened respectability by being admitted into the
hodgepodge anti-Congress Janata coalition that swept
to power in 1977. The period 1990-91 witnessed a
dramatic rise in the strength of the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), successor to the Jan Sangh. This was
especially marked in India's conservative Hindi heartland.
Some observers of the Indian political scene anticipate
that the BJP will be able to form the next government,
either alone or at the head of a new anti-Congress coalition. The changed fortunes of the Hindu nationalists
may be attributed to a variety of factors. Among them
are the termination of the Nehru family dynasty, the
decline in public confidence in the long-ruling and
increasingly corrupt and scandal-ridden Congress
Party, and the failure of any other ideologically based
party to win the allegiance of a major segment of disenchanted Congress supporters. No less important has
been the BJP's ability to project the sense that it stands
for the true India. It appeals mainly to the landed,
albeit nonelite, segments of the rural population and to
the lower middle class of the urban population. Neither of these groups has previously enjoyed a large
share of political power over any sustained period.
Implicit in the appeal of the BJP is a certain rejection
of Western influences, along with a generous dose of
anti-Islamic sentiment vis-a-vis both Pakistan's and
India's own Muslim population.
The BJP's cynical exploitation of popular Hindu emotional sentiment in regard to the controversial destruction of a 16th-century mosque allegedly built over the
site of Lord Rama's birth put the BJP at the center of
public attention and was instrumental in bringing on
the most serious wave of Hindu-Muslim communal
violence since the period of partition. This led to the
dismissal of BJP ministries in four states in December
1992 and their replacement by President's Rule. (This
is shown on figure 12.) Some commentators argue that
the BJP leadership is more representative of the true
India than was the Congress Party-as well as less
corrupt-and anticipate that, once in power, the party
will act with a considerable degree of responsibility
and will restore stability to the nation. I am inclined to
doubt that assessment.

Figure 12
Proportion of India's Population in States Governed by Ethnic Parties, 1965-1993
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Postscript
In legislative assembly elections held in November
1993, the BJP suffered dramatic losses in three of five
states in which it was formerly the ruling party,
including Uttar Predesh, India's most populous state.
On the other hand, it bettered its formerly dominant
position in Rajasthan and won a smashing victory in
Delhi. To a considerable extent, BJP losses were
reflected in Congress gains. Whether, as some observers suggest, the 1993 elections signal that the BJP tide
has crested and begun to fall remains to be seen.
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Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Robert Stoddard
I am going to try to achieve two things: first, integrate
content with what Alex Murphy said yesterday about
general principles through an illustration in South
Asia, using Sri Lanka as an example and, second,
build upon what Dr. Schwartzberg has said about the
background of ethnic diversity in South Asia, but giving a slightly different prediction about India's political future.
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily between
the Sri Lankan Tamils and the mostly Sinhalese government. The Tamils want greater political control
over their lives; therefore, they seek greater autonomy
or even sovereignty over a specific territory. My comments pertain to the controversy over the delineation
of such an area, a territory I will call "the Tamil
region."
At first glance, it would seem that a map showing the
spatial distribution of people according to their ethnicity would provide a fairly objective method for drawing boundaries. However, even so-called objective
regionalization depends upon agreement about, at
least, four conditions which involve fundamental geographic issues. These are:
• The definition of the pertinent population. What
constitutes membership in the ethnic group being
regionalized is illustrated in Sri Lanka by the uncertain status of those classified as Indian Tamils.
Because the Indian Tamils have an uncertain citizenship status, have been less politically active, and
generally belong to a lower caste than the Sri Lankan Tamils, they are usually omitted from the population that defines the Tamil region. But such an
omission is not universally accepted and, as I will
presently show, the inclusion of Indian Tamils can
make a difference.
• The definition of ethnic territory. Territorial belongingness is normally based upon the existence of a
demographic majority. But in a census unit where no
group exceeds 50 percent, a case can be made for
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defining territorial belongingness to the group having only a plurality. In most administrative subdivisions of Sri Lanka, one or another of the ethnic
groups has a very large majority, so the potential for
this kind of controversy is limited to only a few
areas. But these few areas are the critical places of
conflict and are where "ethnic cleansing" is most
likely to occur. Even though intense fighting has
taken place in the Tamil heartland of Jaffna, some of
the severest suffering by noncombatants has
occurred in the peripheral or frontier areas, where no
ethnic group possesses a majority.
• The size of the areal units. The real crux of the territorial problem is one of scale because the homogeneity of a region depends upon the size of the areal
unit that is being clustered to form a regional whole.
• The decision about the necessity for regional contiguity. There is a strong argument for avoiding ethnic
enclaves in any administrative unit. In the Sri Lankan situation, it is difficult to achieve complete contiguity because of the spatial distributions of the
ethnic populations.
Let us examine this regionalization task-that is, the
objective delineation of a Tamil region-by looking at
the distributions of ethnic populations at three areal
scales.
On the provincial level, eight of the nine Sri Lankan
provinces have large majorities consisting of only a
single ethnic group. Furthermore, their geographic
arrangement does not violate the goal of contiguity
(figure 13). In the Eastern Province, however, the largest group has only a plurality. Sri Lankan Tamils, who
have the plurality in this province, insist that it should
be part of their region of control, even though it differs
a little bit from the traditional historical lands. The
government disagrees.
If we look at the district level, the complexity of the
territorial issue is even more evident. In over half the
24 districts, the majority ethnic group exceeds 80 percent of the population. In only three districts does the
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percentage drop below 50 percent. However, the location-and here we come into the geographic aspects
that were emphasized by Dr. Murphy-of these three
districts complicates the task of regionalization. Two
of the plurality districts-Trincomalee and Amparaiare in Eastern Province and present the same definitional problem as produced by the larger provincial
units. The third district, Nuwara Eliya, is located in
the center of the country, where it is surrounded by
Sinhalese majority districts. Furthermore, the ethnic
population that holds the plurality is the Indian Tamil
community. Therefore, if a definition of "Tamil population" were to be expanded to combine both the Sri
Lankan and Indian Tamils, the resulting different ethnic map would produce a Tamil region having a noncontiguous exclave.
Minor civil divisions below the district level are too
small for political autonomy. That does not mean,
however, that these units cannot be used as a basis for
a regionalization scheme. However, the spatial fragmentation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peripheral
zone persists at this scale. In the Trincomalee District,
the population residing along a narrow coastal sliver
forms a plur.ality consisting of a third ethnic groupthe Moors. The geometric complexity of ethnic concentrations is partially solved if the Sri Lankan Tamils
and Indian Tamils are considered as members of the
same ethnic category because the plurality population
of this coastal strip shifts to being Tamil. Although
such a redefinition of the Tamil population tends to
solve some of the problems of contiguity along the
east coast, as noted above, it complicates the regionalization task in the central part of the country.
Thus, it is evident that a major contributor to ethnic
conflicts is the distributional pattern of contending
populations. Also, this Sri Lankan situation reinforces
the generalization made yesterday: the areas where
atrocities are most likely to occur, and from which
most refugees would originate, are the zones of ethnic
transition between the regional core areas of the differing ethnic groups.
Now, let me shift to the second topic which concerns
India, where I would like to deal with a nonterritorial
conflict. My own interests have usually focused upon
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ethnoregionalism more than on the non spatial interclass struggles for power. However, interclass strategies have real implications for the Hindu nationalist
movement.
It is critical to note that we are dealing with two major
perspectives on Indian nationalism, the secular and the
Hindu. Indian secular nationalism is well illustrated
by the leadership of Nehru, who expounded, practiced, and institutionalized the pluralistic society.
From this perspective, the Indian nation-state is based
upon a syncretic view of Indian culture and a federal
system of government. All religions, alljatis, all languages, and all people within the territory of this
country have equal opportunity under the law, according to the Constitution. The laws of the land accommodate both the wishes of the majority, as expressed
by free and democratic elections, and the rights of the
minorities.

In contrast, Hindu nationalists believe that the nation
should be based not only on common culture but also
upon the religion of Hinduism. The more extreme
forms want to rule India as a Hindu state and rid the
country of all non-Hindu persons and influences. The
more benign forms of Hindu nationalism seek unity
among the various castes and languages in India
through the common heritage of living within a "Hinduized" land.
From the perspective of the Hindu nationalists, Buddhists, J ains, and Sikhs already share a more or less
simliar sacred geography. Because of their origins,
their holy lands are within the same Hinduized land.
The Jews and the Parsis came from foreign areas, but,
because these communities are small, they have not
been a particular problem. On the other hand, Hindus
view Christians and Muslims-with their doctrinaire
ideas-as a problem. The nonacceptance of Muslims
is especially strong because:
• Muslims are associated with the invasions from
circa 1000 to later than 1500.

• Some Muslim leaders, insisting that Muslims belong
to a separate nation, carved Pakistan from a "part of
India."
• The Indian Muslim population is large enough to
make a significant difference.
If the BJP were to gain national power, it is difficult to
predict whether stability would be restored to the
nation. But we can predict that, if the right wing of the
Hindu nationalists should gain power, there would
most likely be mass, even widespread, conflicts in
areas where significant Muslim populations now live.
A plausible scenario would be massive outmigrations
similar to those that occurred during partition. A worst
case scenario would be another war between India and
Pakistan-this time with nuclear weapons.

and has accommodated differences through the ages.
The eclectic and nonideological nature of Hinduism
and the other indigenous religions of South Asia certainly provides a deeply ingrained cultural propensity
for the acceptance of differences. It is true that
throughout most of history the people of the subcontinent did not live in a single political unit and that the
various regional states did engage in fighting, but
most conflicts did not result from the kind of major
ideological crusade that separates people for centuries
and produces long-lasting hatreds.
Certainly it is in the best interest of the United States,
as the leader of the democratic world, to support the
forces of pluralism in South Asia.

General Discussion
In spite of several conditions that can lead to conflict,
there are strong reasons for believing that India will
not erupt into major ethnic wars, with the possible
exception of Kashmir. Other than Kashmir, there is
strong evidence that India is not as ethnically volatile
as many other regions in the world. First, note that the
population of India exceeds all of Africa, all of Latin
America, or all of Europe, none of which is in a single
nation-state or single country. All these other regions
are splintered into many states, and the people within
each show little evidence of uniting politically. In contrast, even with all the diversity among the people of
India, the nation has remained together for almost half
a century. Furthermore, this has been accomplished
within a mostly democratic environment again, something that has not been achieved in Third World countries in Africa or in Latin America. It also contrasts
with the situation in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, where ethnic feelings were suppressed
by dictatorial governments. That success provides a
basis for predicting that ethnic conflicts will not be
more severe in India than elsewhere.
A second reason for predicting fewer ethnic conflicts
within India than in many other major world regions is
based on the Indic culture. Maybe India's success is
just a happenstance of outstanding secular leadership
at the time of, and immediately after, independence
and, therefore, will dissipate with time. Yet, secular
nationalism does seem to have a firm foundation,
namely the Indic culture, which has nurtured tolerance
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DR. GLADNEY: I am always, and I think everybody
is, amazed that India is still together. You mentioned
the term success in that regard. I wonder if you could
talk a little bit more about why this is a success, particularly considering the poverty of India, the civil
strife, the Hindu-Muslim clashes, and the separatists
like the Kashmiris. Why is it that keeping the country
together is successful?
DR. STODDARD: Maybe the term "success" is a little bit strong, especially if we define a successful state
as one that eliminates poverty, as well as reducing
civil strife. And, I do not deny that the Hindu-Muslim
clashes are just as worrisome in India as religious conflicts in Northern Ireland, in the Caucasus, or in Lebanon. Furthermore, half a century may be too short a
time to declare full success. Moreover, the durability
of India as a state may partly reflect the lack of a
highly politicized populace. After all, the 67 percent
of the population that resides in rural areas live a life
that is pretty much circumscribed by their local environment. Although there is a rising politicization, as
expressed by the percentage of people who have voted
in the recent elections, the stability of a peasant agrarian economy or agrarian society probably goes a long
way toward explaining the relative success.

DR. SCHWARTZBERG: The Indian Government has
been willing to pull back. This has not happened yet in
Kashmir and Punjab, however.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the Kashmir situation?
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: I plan to work on Kashmir
during the coming year. The people in Kashmir are
alienated to a degree that will preclude their reconciliation with India. I cannot predict exactly the shape of
the future of Kashmir, but I will predict that there will
be a significant change in the situation there.
I am more optimistic in the case of Punjab, a richer
area and strategically much more important. There
seem to be signs that India has the Punjab situation
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under control. However, the raid on the Golden Temple will not soon be forgotten, nor the many other
human rights abuses that the Indian Government has
committed in the name of quelling that insurrection. I
believe, however, that the prospects for reconciliation
exist, and many people who know Punjab better than I
do say that, even at the worst of times, the majority of
Sikhs were always moderate and that the extremists
never represented the Sikh rank and file.
One fundamental difference between Kashmir and the
Punjab is that the dissociation of Punjab from India
would probably let loose an unstoppable Balkanization of India, while dissociation of Kashmir would not
necessarily result in such an outcome.

